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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the servient cstate. 17 It has also been held that if part of the casement is
taxed, then that portion survives.' 8
In the principle case, the court extcndcd the majority view that the case-
mcnt is carved from the servient estate, is apart from it, and is not taxed
with it. This is the more logical view, and is compatible with the theory
that an absolute title is given of the servicnt cstate, as required by statute,
and yet protects the dominant estate. The logic of this reasoning must be
conceded. However, such a fine distinction does defeat the giving of an
actual unencumbered grant to the tax purchaser.
TORTS-DENIAL OF INTERVENTION BY INSURER UNDER
FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Plaintiff, in course of her employment, was severely injured by de-
fendant's automobile. The employee had filed her claim against the em-
ployer and the insurance carrier, but subsequently brought the present action
against defendant. The insurance carrier, which had already paid the sum
of $6,750 as required by the Workmen's Compensation Law, moved to
intervene in the suit as party-plaintiff. Motion was denied. Held, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, employer's insurance carrier was not en-
titled to intervene as a party-plaintiff in a suit by an injured employee against
a third-party tort-fcasor. The injured employee was not required to bring
such suit for herself and for the use and benefit of insurance carrier.'
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Bedingfeld, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952).
In the 47 states that have enacted workmen's compensation acts,2 there
is little uniformity among the various provisions and any attempt to classify
the particular statutes pertaining to the liability of third persons is difficult.3
Florida, by enacting the new amendment to its Workmen's Compensation
Act, became one of the states now adhering to the liberal policy which.
enables the employee to simultaneously accept compensation and sue the
third party.' The employer or insurance carrier is subrogated, to the extent
17. Gulf Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 194 Okla. 331, 151 P.2d 419 (1944); Hayes v.
Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946) (the value of the servient estate need not be
lowered).
18. Magnolia v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 175 P.2d 133 (1946).
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1951) as amended Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26546, abolishing
the election requirement and providing that an injured employee may claim workmen's
compensation benefits and at the same time institute suit against a third party tort-feasor.
It further provides that such suit may be brought in the name of the injured employee
as plaintiff or, at the option of the injured employee, may be brought in the name of
the injured employee for the use and benefit of the employer or insurance carrier, as the
case may be, as plaintiffs.
2. Mississippi is the only state that has no workmen's compensation act.
3. MONT. L. REV. 91 (1946).
4. See 7 MONT. L. REV. 91-94 (1946) for a complete analysis as to how the various
jurisdictions treat third party liability in workmen's compensation acts generally.
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of compensation liability paid, out of the recovery from the third party.
The majority of jurisdictions continue to employ the election doctrine, the
employee either receiving compensation and having the employer or insurer
subrogated to his right in the action against the third party, or pursuing
his common law remedy.6
Subrogation is primarily a right created by equity to compel ultimate
discharge of debt7 or obligation by one who, in fairness and good conscience,
ought to pay it." Since the liability of an employer or insurer for compensa-
tion is separate and distinct from the liability of a third party tort-feasor,"
the employer's or insurer's right of subrogation would not exist in the absence
of statute.10 It is obvious that the extent to which a compensation act de-
prives the employer or employee of his causes of action or defenses depends
basically upon the language of the act itself.1
When entitled to indemnity for compensation paid, the employer should
be brought into the proceeding.12 Even though the insurance carrier has
paid the compensation, under a provision that the employer shall be sub-
rogated to the rights of the employee or dependents, it has been held that
the employer should be a party to the action.' 3 Some jurisdictions maintain
that upon acceptance of compensation by the injured employee, the action
must be prosecuted in the name of the employer 1 4 Other states modify this
ruling by holding that the employer may bring the action in the employee's
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1951) as amended Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26546.
6. Ibid. This statute, prior to the amendment, exemplifies how a majority of juris-
dictions continue to treat third party liability.
7. American Surety Co. v. Bethlehem Nat. Bank, 314 U.S. 314 (1941); Goodwin
v. Schmidt, 5 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1941). Compare Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia
Casualty Co., 156 So. 116 (Fla. 1934) (dissenting opinion defining subrogation) with
Fee v. Perry, 154 So. 140 (Fla. 1934) (doctrine of subrogation not allowed by equity, if
it would deprive the party of legal right).
8. BALLANTINE LAw DICTIONARY, Subrogation (2nd ed. 1948); Grand Corp. v.
City of New York, 288 N.Y, 178, 42 N.E.2d 475 (1942). See McKenzie v. Missouri
Stables, Inc., 225 Mo. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930) for differentiation between legal and
conventional subrogation.
9. Lake v. State, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 361 (1951).
10. Milan v. Kausch, 194 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1952); Metropolitan Cs. Ins. Co. of
New York v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 241 Ala. 545, 3 So.2d 306 1941).
11. Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 145 Kan. 273, 65 P.2d 284 (1937),
12. Black v. Chicago Great Western R.R., 187 Iowa 904, 174 N.W. 774 (1919); cf.
Spinner v, Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 53 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1932) (although em-
ployer may ioin action, he does not have to reimburse employee s attorneys); Book v. City
of Henderson, 176 Ky. 785, 197 S.W. 449 (1917); Anzer v. ltumes-Deal Co., 332 Mo.
432, 58 S.W.2d 962 (1933); Moltz v. Sherwood Bros., 116 Pa. Super. 231, 176 Atl. 842
(1935). See 10 F.R.D. 14.
13. Anzer v. 1-umes-Deal Co., 332 Mo. 432, 58 SW.2d 962 (1933); cf. Marshall
Jackson Co. v. effery, 167 Wis. 63, 166 N.W. 647 (1918). Contra: Henderson Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Owensboro Home Tel. & Tel. Co., 192 Ky. 332, 233 S.W. 743 (1921)
(where neither employer nor insurer could bring action, because statute required that
employer make payments and payment was in fact made by insurer). Compare Storm
& Butts v, Lippscomb, 117 Cal. App. 6, 3 P.2d 567 (1931); Stackpole v. Pacific Gas &
Electric Co.. 181 Cal. 700, 186 Pac. 354 (1919) (both employer and insurer joined).
14. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v, Moses, 287 U.S. 530 (1933); ci. Lake v. Sta.te, 71 Idaho
107, 227 P.2d 361 (1951) (where employer does not exercise right). Compare Metro-
politan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 241 Ala. 545, 3
So.2d 306 (1941).
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name so long as the employer is an active litigant." The employer has been
held the only necessary party in an action where acceptance of compensation
shall operate as an assignment to the employer of the right of the injured
party. This has applied even where a provision existed that the employee or
representative shall receive the excess over expenses, benefits furnished by
the employer, and compensation paid and payable.' 6 Where the insurance
carrier has paid compenstion it has been declared "the real party in interest",
necessitating the action being brought in its name."1
On the other hand, it has been held that neither the employer 8 nor the
insurer,'9 even though they are primarily the beneficiaries of the action, are
necessary parties to an action by the employee against a third person. Where
the statute is silent as to parties in interest, the right of action still remained
in the injured employee, and the suit must be brought in his name, although
the employer or insurer might be joined.20
The court, in the principal case. is mainly concerned with the problem
of subrogation, and reiterates that the compensation insurer has no rights
of subrogation or assignment except that given it by statute. The case has
been approached very practically and in the future the employee, upon elect-
15. Melella v. Savage, 59 F. Supp, 258 (D. Del. 1945).
16. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530 (1933); cf. Moore v. Hechinger, 127
F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1942). Compare Terminal Shipping Co. v. Branham, 47 F. Supp.
561 (D. Md. 1942); Lebak v. Nelson, 62 Idaho 96, 107 P.2d 1054 (1940). For explana-
tion as to what constitutes an employer, see Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 193
P.2d 831 (1948). Contra: Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d
98 (1944); Biersach v. Weehselbeig, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W. 905 (1931) (where em-
ployee still had an interest in recovery even though employer became assignee by operation
of law).
17. Wilton v. Radish, 267 App. Div. 970, 47 N.Y.S.2d 823, (2nd Dept. 1944); cf.
Moore v. Heehinger, 127 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Haslam v. Trailways of New
England, 59 F. Supp. 441 (D. Con. 1945); Stinchcomb v. Dodson, 190 Okla. 643, 126
P.2d 257 (1942); accord, Alexander v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652 (S.D. Mich. 1944); Sloss-
Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Metropolitan Cas. Co. of New York, 28 Ala. App. 366, 185
So. 395, cert. denied 273 Ala. 43, 185 So. 399 (1938). But 4. I-layhurst v. Henry, 102
F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Tex. 1951) (insurer not indispensable party to suit); Hall v. Henry
Thayer & Co., 225 Mass. 15, 113 N.E. 644 (1916) (where insurer could bring suit in
administratrix name for own benefit). Contra: First Nat. Bank in Greensburg v. M &
C Convoy, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Pa. 1952) (where insurer may join as a party
plaintiff, but action does not have to be brought in his name); Stark v. Gripp, 150 Md.
655, 133 AtI. 338 (1926) (where insurer had not brought action within required period);
4f. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Lighterage Corp., 271 N.Y. Supp. 212 (1935). '
18. Brown v. Southern R.R., 202 N.C. 256, 162 S.E. 613 (1932); Ierardi v. Farmer's
Trust Co., 4 Harr. 246, 151 Atd. 822 (Del. Super. 1928); cf. McKenzie v. Missouri
Stables, Inc. 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930) (where employee has beneficial
interest in cause of action entitling him to maintain same as real party in interest). See
Thomas v. Otis Elevator Co., 103 Neb. 401, 172 NW. 53 (1919) (where agreement
existed between employer and employee); cf. Oliver v. Nelson, 128 Neb. 160, 258 N.W.
69 (1934) (employer must be joined). But see Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission,
81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239, 243 (1932) (under Utah act, employee could bring own
action if he had not in fact assigned right to employer).
19. McGuigan v. Allen, 165 Minn. 390, 206 N.W. 714 (1925); cf. Anderson v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 231 Minn, 469, 43 N.W.2d 807 (1950).
20. William v. Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works, 85 Pa. Super. 537 (1925).
CASES NOTED
ing to accept compensation, 2' need not find himself at the mercy of the
employer or compensation insurer, as he did prior to the amendment. 22
In the past the employee was frequently forced to accept compensation
in order to pay debts that had arisen from the injury. Because of the elec-
tion he might find himself dealing with an insurance carrier, who was not
only the compensation carrier, but who also carried the liability insurance
for the third person. When a situation of this nature would arise, the carrier
would be interested in settling for or collecting the smallest sum possible,
provided the amount recovered amounted to the extent of its payment as
compensation insurer to the injured employee. Now, without forfeiting his
compensation benefits, the employee may attempt to be fully compensated
in damages from the third person, including such elements of damage as pain
and suffering, mental anguish or loss of consortium, which are not covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Law.23
TORTS - DETERMINATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
UNDER FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A United States Army corporal stationed on Guam was issued a trip
ticket authorizing him to use a weapons carrier for official business. The
corporal used the vehicle for unofficial purposes and injured plaintiff. Held,
that under the Federal Tort Claims Act,' to determine the scope of employ-
ment the courts look to Federal law and decisions. Local law is used only
to determine tort liability. Williams v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 208
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
The purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act2 is to give persons having
claims against the United States the right to bring suit.8 The difficulty
arises in the interpretation of Section 1346(b), which allows claims where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.'I
It is accepted that local law should be used to determine the negligence of
the governmental employee,5 but the courts differ as to which law determines
21. See note 5 supra.
22. For analysis of FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1951) prior to amendment see Note, 1 U.
OF FLA. L. REv. 278-283 (1948).
23. FLA. STAT. c. 440 (1951).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946). The district courts . . . shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions . . . against the United States . . . arising from . . . the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United Statcs, if a
private person would be liable to the claimant in accord with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
3. United States v. Campbell, 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
5. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1949); United States v. Sharpe, 189 F.2d
239 (4th Cir. 1951).
